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Beyond Liberals and Conservatives to
Political Genotypes and Phenotypes
John R. Alford, Carolyn L. Funk, and John R. Hibbing
In the past, most political scientists have been oblivious to the growing empirical evidence challenging environmental determinism.
Professor Charney, apparently as a result of the fact that genes and the environment interact in a complex fashion, advocates that this
passive unawareness be replaced by active denial. Science, however, does not advance by avoiding important relationships merely
because they are complicated and, fortunately, science is not heeding Charney’s ideologically-based fears. Molecular geneticists,
often working in tandem with political scientists, are quickly moving beyond twin studies to identify the specific suites of genes and
biological systems that predict variation in core political preferences, whatever labels those preferences might be given in a particular
culture at a particular time. We sympathize with the fact that our empirical findings, like those of so many behavioral geneticists,
make Charney uncomfortable; still, his critique serves up nothing new—empirically or otherwise. Just as analyses of the roots of
sexual preferences cannot presumptively ignore genetics, neither can analyses of the roots of political preferences.
M ind-body dualism allows that the physical body isthe product of natural, presumably genetic forcesbut insists that the source of the human mind is
mystical and fundamentally different. The mind is not
nature’s but our own creation, shaped as we navigate and
are influenced by historical and cultural realities that we
have constructed. The human mind, dualism asserts, unlike
all other aspects of life on our planet, transcends crude
biological processes. And what better example of a pris-
tine experiential, non-biological, uniquely-human phe-
nomenon than mass-scale politics with its relatively recent
advent and its constantly changing issues, terms, parties,
and players. For those caught in the hubris of this dualist
perspective, empirical evidence indicating that political
orientations are transmitted genetically as well as cultur-
ally seems patently “incoherent” and must be the product
of a flawed methodology.
Thus it is that Evan Charney rises to attack a recent
article of ours in the American Political Science Review, 1
an article he fears is part of “a trend among behavioral
scientists to view ever more complex attitudes as in some
sense genetically determined.”2 We welcome the appear-
ance of Charney’s essay. The scientific process needs schol-
ars eager to question methodologies, data, interpretations,
and implications. Genetics in general and twin studies in
particular are not familiar topics to most political scien-
tists. Several of the misconceptions evident in Charney’s
written remarks are undoubtedly held by other members
of the discipline so we are pleased to have been offered the
opportunity to explain our procedures, findings, and con-
clusions more fully. Charney’s criticisms fall into two broad
categories. The first is that the methods we employed to
obtain our results—specifically, the classical twin design—
rest on faulty assumptions and therefore yield meaning-
less results. The second, drawing directly from a dualist
perspective, is that political beliefs are entirely embedded
in culture and therefore, logically could not have a genetic
component. We address each of these charges in turn.
Our central point is that it is insufficient merely to assert
the implausibility of political ideology being partially her-
itable; ultimately this matter can and must be decided by
the scientific process.
The Methodical Challenge
Much of Charney’s methodological critique centers on
what has come to be termed the “equal environments
assumption” (EEA). Monozygotic (MZ) twins share 100
percent of their genetic heritage while dizygotic (DZ) twins,
like all full siblings, share roughly 50 percent. This known
difference in genetic similarity across the two types of twins
provides an opportunity to estimate the importance of
genetic similarity—but only if the environments of MZ
and DZ twins are equally similar. If, relative to DZ twins,
MZ twins not only share more of their genetic code but
also share more of their environmental experiences, vari-
ance attributed to genetics may actually be the result of
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environmental forces. Thus, the key concern is that heri-
tability estimates will be inflated while the effect of shared
environment will be underestimated.
The equal environments assumption is an important
concern and Charney is quite right to raise it, but the
EEA has been the subject of a tremendous amount of
debate and research and Charney does not provide a fair
assessment of current wisdom in the behavioral genetics
literature. We have space to offer only a few corrections.
One misconception springs from Charney’s treatment of
the environment as exogenous even as such a practice is
invalidated by his own argument. Charney invokes a com-
ment from Horwitz et al. pointing out that “because mono-
zygotic twins have greater physical resemblance to each
other than dizygotic twins, they could have a greater chance
of receiving similar social reactions.”3 If, as Charney and
Horwitz believe, genes shape physical traits that in turn
shape social reactions that in turn shape beliefs, the link-
age structure is complete and genes will affect beliefs.
Whether the causal order is [genesr beliefs] or [genesr
physical traitsr social reactionsr beliefs], the underlying
cause is still genetic. An example of the endogeneity of
environmental forces is provided by O’Connor et al. who
report that adoptive children genetically at risk for anti-
social behavior are significantly more likely than not-at-
genetic risk adoptive children to be the recipient of negative
parenting from their adoptive parents.4 Negative parent-
ing is typically assumed to be the cause of children’s anti-
social behavior but in point of fact children play an
important role in shaping their own environment, in this
case by influencing the behavior of their parents.
Even if we pretend genes have nothing to do with shap-
ing the environment, the EEA withstands analysis. A sur-
prising number of the parents of twins, as many as 20–30
percent in some studies, mis-categorize the zygosity of their
twins, thus creating a valuable opportunity to distinguish
environmental from genetic influences. If Charney is
correct, the determining factor in twin pairs’ degree of sim-
ilarity should be their perceived zygosity; if we are correct,
the determining factor in degree of similarity should be their
actual zygosity.The results of these mis-categorization stud-
ies are clear: DZ twin pairs believed by their environments
to be MZ twin pairs are no more similar than DZ twin pairs
believed to be DZ twin pairs.5 This basic finding is impos-
sible to explain if the environment is all that matters.
MZ twins are indeed more likely to share certain envi-
ronmental experiences. They are, for example, more likely
than DZ twins to share the same bedroom and to have the
same friends but this fact in and of itself does not consti-
tute a fatal flaw for twin studies.6 The central question is
whether variable similarity on friends and bedrooms inde-
pendently influences the specific trait of interest—in this
case, political beliefs—and no evidence has yet been pre-
sented that it does. In fact, empirical evidence goes fur-
ther and demonstrates that the correlation between the
overall frequency of twin contact and the similarity of
their social and political attitudes is small and statistically
insignificant.7 In terms of politics this result is not all that
surprising since it seems unlikely that the parents of DZ
twins are more likely than the parents of MZ twins to
push each of their twins in a different political direction.
Compared to the parents of MZ twins, why would the
parents of DZ twins be less desirous that all of their off-
spring share the same political beliefs?
But rather than debate what is plausible or implausible
let us turn again to the empirical evidence. The most impor-
tant challenge we wish to issue to Charney concerning the
EEA involves the differential heritability estimates of polit-
ical attitudes on the one hand and party identification on
the other. Similar to previous research,8 we estimate the
heritability of political and social attitudes to be in the .4
to .5 range, leaving .5 to .6 attributable to environmental
factors. But these same procedures reveal that party iden-
tification is only about .14 heritable, leaving .86 attribut-
able to the environment, so the classical twin design reports
a dramatic difference in the heritability of political beliefs
and party identification. Interestingly, other research iden-
tifies precisely the same pattern for religious beliefs (strong
heritability) as opposed to religious denominational affil-
iation (minimal to no heritability).9 If violations of the
EEA are responsible for reported heritability, Charney must
argue that parents of MZ and DZ twins raise their chil-
dren equally similarly with regard to party identification
but differentially with regard to political attitudes. Why
would parents of DZ twins socialize their twins to have
the same party identification but different political beliefs,
while parents of MZ twins socialize their twins to have
both similar party identifications and similar political
beliefs?
Rather than merely relying on assertions, we have also
empirically estimated heritability while accounting for the
EEA. To do so, we have re-estimated our findings from
the Virginia 30K sample using more sophisticated struc-
tural equation models that account for shared environ-
mental influences from other family relationships—
namely parents and non-twin siblings.10 This re-estimation
with non-twin data allows us to correct for shared effects
among siblings and to estimate twin-specific environment
effects. The findings support our original claims that genet-
ics accounts for at least 40 percent of the variance in ideo-
logical orientations as measured by the 28-item Wilson-
Patterson index. A different approach is taken by Fowler,
Baker and Dawes in their tests of the heritability of voter
turnout.11 Fowler et al. test the comparability of MZ and
DZ pairs on a number of politically-relevant variables and
indicators of socioeconomic status. They find no mean
differences between MZ and DZ pairs on these political
and social variables, thus demonstrating that the trait-
specific environment is simply too equal to offer any power
in explaining away the heritability findings. Research in
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other areas has similarly shown either that the EEA is
valid or that violations of it are too modest to negate
results indicating the important influence of genes.12
Twin studies do have the potential to mislead. One of
Charney’s central points is that genes and the environ-
ment cannot be partitioned neatly (e.g., 14 percent genetic
and 86 percent environmental) since they interact in such
complicated ways. In so saying, however, Charney is only
parroting a point we stressed in our original article: “Gene
culture interaction is the key to understanding the source
of political attitudes and behaviors, just as it is the key to
understanding most physical and behavioral aspects of the
human condition. Genes do not work in isolation and
instead generally influence the extent to which organisms
are responsive to particular environmental conditions.”13
Providing statistical estimates of the effects of genetics,
shared environment, and unshared environment is not
tantamount to asserting that these effects work in isola-
tion from each other. We know of no practitioner of twin
studies who believes they do. The interactions among genes
and between genes and the environment create an amaz-
ingly complex situation. The good news is that, since Char-
ney apparently believes genes and the environment interact
to influence phenotypes, he must agree with us that genes
are indeed behaviorally relevant.
Charney is also concerned with the fact that estimates
of heritability are specific to a given population in a given
environment and are therefore subject to substantial vari-
ation. This is an important point, and its import is often
misunderstood, as it is by Charney. Look carefully at his
example (one that can be reproduced in many other guises).
He describes a study that examines the heritability of maze
running ability in mice, utilizing mice selectively bred for
high or low ability on this trait. As Charney describes the
results:
For mice raised in a “standard” environment heritability of this
trait was high. The researchers then raised the offspring of the
genetically selected lines in two “extreme environments,” a cog-
nitively poor one (dull colors all around, no toys) and a cogni-
tively enriched one (bright colors and patterns, many toys). Both
the bright and dull lines behaved “stupidly” in the poor environ-
ment and “smartly” in the enriched one, with the result that the
heritability of the trait dropped to zero in both extreme environ-
ments. The bright and dull mice may well have inherited what-
ever genes are linked to intelligence (or maze running aptitude)
in mice (which is what they were bred for), but the heritability of
the trait of intelligence was shown to be highly dependent upon
post-natal environment.14
Several points are of critical importance here. First, notice
that Charney admits to the well-established fact that the
mice “may well have inherited whatever genes are linked
to intelligence.” Second, notice that when mice were raised
in a standard environment, estimates of heritability cor-
rectly detected the significant role of genes in influencing
maze-running ability. Only when mice were raised in arti-
ficially extreme environments did the apparent heritability
of intelligence drop to near zero. Actual genetic inheri-
tance continued to take place and the separate offspring of
the two distinct lines would still show divergent abilities if
raised in a standard environment. The extreme environ-
ments only inhibited the ability of a test of heritability to
detect this continued role of genetic transmission and the
direction of any bias in the estimate of heritability is con-
servative. In this study, extreme environments led to under-
estimation of the role genes play in the natural world, not
to over-estimation. Far from suggesting that we should
not put much faith in high estimates of heritably (such as
those we found for political orientations), this example
demonstrates the reverse. Studies finding zero heritability
in specific environments are the ones that may be suspect,
and can produce results that mask the true role of genes in
the transmission of behavioral traits.
In one important area of methodology we are in full
agreement with Charney. Twin studies should be seen as
the beginning and not the end of research in this area and
we are following this model in our own research. The twin
design is typically and most profitably employed as a pre-
cursor to additional genetic work. Wet genetic techniques
such as linkage analysis, which can isolate the location of
genes relevant to a phenotypic behavior of interest, are
best conducted with DNA drawn from close relatives such
as twins. Many twin registries now have data banks con-
taining the twins’ DNA because of the value in using the
same subjects to assess heritability levels and then to con-
duct genotyping work. Behavioral geneticists commonly
move seamlessly back and forth from the twin design to
bench genetics. We are currently working with several
geneticists including Nicholas Martin (Laboratory Head
of Genetic Epidemiology at the Queensland Institute of
Medical Research in Brisbane), Lindon Eaves (Professor
of Human Genetics at the Virginia Commonwealth Uni-
versity School of Medicine), and Shelley D. Smith (Direc-
tor of Molecular Genetics at the University of Nebraska
Medical Center) and have begun the process of statisti-
cally associating particular genetic alleles with political
beliefs and political behaviors, a technique called allelic
association.
Twin studies alone are no substitute for using linkage
analysis and allelic association studies to find the specific
genes contributing to the heritability of political attitudes,
but searching for specific genes would be a waste of time
absent evidence of heritability. With billions of nucleotide
base-pairs in the nucleus of most human cells, locating
the relevant individual genes is a challenging, multidisci-
plinary undertaking. Even when associations are found,
much work remains since correlations alone will not reveal
the complex pathway between genotype and phenotype.
No serious scholars doubt the difficulties attending efforts
to link genes to political behaviors and beliefs but we have
no doubts this link will eventually be established. Addi-
tional information on the role of evolution, emotions, the
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limbic system, and neurotransmitters in shaping personal
and political traits emerges every week15 and the pace is
only going to pick up, making it an uncomfortable time
for dualists such as Charney.
Charney writes that “Alford, Funk, and Hibbing have
not discovered a set of genes corresponding to their hypoth-
esis of genetic causation.” This is quite true, we have not.
But, as noted above, we are working on it. Scholars else-
where have uncovered genes involved with reading disor-
ders, depression, autism, risk-taking, and attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder. Expecting one article to identify
conclusively the specific genes and biological systems
responsible for the heritability of something as complex as
political beliefs is unfair. Achieving this goal will take
numerous scholars working for extended periods of time
in close inter-disciplinary cooperation and to say this effort
should not be undertaken because it is “complicated” is
both defeatist and anti-science.
Political Attitudes, Orientations,
and Ideologies
Charney’s critique of twin studies is predictable and largely
uninformed by the state of the art in behavioral genetics,
but the second half of his article provides the opportunity
for an important scholarly exchange on the nature of polit-
ical attitudes, political orientations, and political ideolo-
gies. Here Charney challenges our work on two grounds;
first a narrow issue concerning current U.S. ideological
divisions, and second a much broader conceptual cri-
tique. We will address the narrower issue first.
Charney contends that our findings from the twin study
are flawed because the collection of issues in the Wilson-
Patterson index holds no face validity as a measure of
political ideology and because they indicate the “wrong”
issues as being the most heritable. Specifically, the highest
heritability levels reported in our article are for property
taxes, school prayer, “Moral Majority,” capitalism, and
astrology. Charney believes, rightly, that this is a curious
collection of issues. He asserts that the highest heritability
should be for abortion, gay rights, and other hot-button
social issues related to sexuality and religion or that, at the
very least our index of conservatism should give more
weight to these issues.
Charney’s concerns here are largely a moot point, how-
ever. As mentioned in our article, assortative mating is
particularly powerful with regard to political and religious
beliefs (conservatives mate with conservatives and liberals
mate with liberals) and if parents are genetically similar
then simple twin designs such as the one we employed
will underestimate heritability.16 Applying the simplest pos-
sible correction for assortative mating identifies the fol-
lowing five issues, in order, as the most heritable:
1. Living together (.67)
2. School prayer (.66)
3. Abortion (.64)
4. X-rated movies (.63)
5. Gay rights (.60).
If Charney is correct that an acceptable test for estimating
heritability of political orientations must indicate high lev-
els of heritability for the social issues that he calls “the
central concerns dividing liberals and conservatives,” then
the twin study findings pass this test with flying colors.
On a broader front, Charney probably speaks for a
majority of political scientists in maintaining that politi-
cal attitudes are socially constructed, free-standing orien-
tations to political concepts and issues. Charney is especially
taken with the context-bound nature of words such as
liberal, conservative, left, and right. Since these terms are
culturally rooted, he seems to conclude that any orienta-
tion to politics must be culturally rooted. He spends much
of his essay recounting the history of these terms, showing
that what it means to be a liberal today in the United
States is not what it meant to be a liberal in France in the
seventeenth century. And, of course, for much of the world,
terms like “liberal” have no meaning at all. Given this,
Charney asks, how is it possible that there could be a
genetic basis for liberalism or any other political concept?
Our measure of political orientation consisted of an
additive index of the 28 Wilson-Patterson items available
to us from the Virginia 30K study (contrary to Charney’s
claims, we used all 28 items present in the survey and did
not pick some items and exclude others). We used these
items as an index scored to reflect a continuum from lib-
eral to conservative attitude positions. In choosing our
language for discussing political orientation we opted for
descriptors common to the field of political science, but
which are probably not the most apt descriptors for the
underlying phenotype. We believe that the actual under-
lying phenotype, whatever it is ultimately labeled, will be
applicable across time and place. As such, what we have
called “bedrock principles of group life” is more likely to
fit the bill. The empirical evidence showing a genetic com-
ponent for specific attitude positions, for example, is likely
to reflect an indirect role of genetics on attitudes through
the heritability of values or orientations more fundamen-
tal to living in social groups.
Recent work by Peter K. Hatemi and colleagues dem-
onstrates that vote choice is not directly heritable but rather
primarily indirectly heritable through political attitudes
toward issues such as abortion, school prayer, and the death
penalty.17 Up to now, detailed measures of social and polit-
ical orientations have not been administered to twins (a
situation we are in the process of remedying thanks to a
recent grant from the National Science Foundation). When
data on core preferences for social group life are available
we predict they will show that attitudes toward school
prayer, abortion, and the death penalty are themselves
indirectly heritable and that what is directly heritable are
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orientations to bedrock principles of group life. But, of
course, these ideas have yet to be tested and must be con-
sidered in comparison with alternative conceptualizations
of the underlying phenotype.
We have evidence in both the U.S. and Australia for a
sizeable genetic component in the transmission of politi-
cal orientations but this is not yet enough to claim with
confidence that these findings are applicable across all cul-
tures and contexts. Regardless, we do not agree with Char-
ney’s unsubstantiated assertion that culture universals do
not exist. Schwartz and Bardi’s recent cross-cultural study
of values more realistically captures the situation:
Studies at the national level reveal a great deal of variation in the
value priorities of individuals within societies as well as groups
across nations. The research suggests that individuals both within
and across societies have quite different value priorities that reflect
their different genetic heritage, personal experiences, social loca-
tions, and enculturation. Yet hidden behind these important dif-
ferences is a surprise that may reflect something about the origins
and role of values for human society. Researchers, including our-
selves, have focused almost exclusively on differences in value
priorities. When we switch our focus to ask about similarities,
we discover a striking degree of consensus across individuals and
societies . . . Differences are more salient and compelling than
similarities. It may therefore be difficult to accept that a largely
shared, pan-cultural value hierarchy lies hidden behind the strik-
ing value differences that draw our attention. Differences help us
to identify the influences of unique genetic heritage, personal
experience, social structure, and culture on value priorities. The
pan-cultural hierarchy points to the bases of values in shared
human nature and to the adaptive functions of values in main-
taining societies. To gain a full understanding of human value
priorities, we must take note of the interplay of both differences
and similarities.18
Charney rightly raises the critical question of just how
genes could influence political beliefs. Numerous possibili-
ties exist. The connection could run through personality;
it could run through temperaments such as risk-taking,
fear, and preference for structure and certainty; it could
run through a tendency to hold beliefs intensely or casu-
ally; or it could even run through genetically-based phys-
ical traits, as Charney speculates. There are endless
possibilities and we do not pretend to know the actual
mechanisms. This is what we are investigating now. As
mentioned above, our collaborative research with the goal
of associating particular genetic alleles with particular
political beliefs and behaviors will move us down that
path. But it will be a long and difficult process, requiring
collaborative efforts among scholars with an open mind
and a healthy respect for the scientific process of testing
and revising hypotheses based on empirical observation.
Led by numerous social scientists including Jost, Haidt,
and Thornhill, there is growing support for seeing political
ideology as springing from deeper, seemingly non-political
traits.19 Of course, researchers have long noted the connec-
tion between personality and politics and the evidence is
rapidly building that political ideology is intimately con-
nected with other aspects of temperament.20 For example,
compared to liberals, political conservatives have funda-
mentally different approaches to child-rearing.21 Our own
recent analysis finds that a simple four-item strict parent-
ing scale is strongly correlated with the Wilson-Patterson
index (r .45; p .001). Similarly, people who say “good
manners and cleanliness matter” are more likely to be polit-
ically conservative (gamma .32; p .001) and people who
“would take drugs that may have strange effects” are more
likely to be politically liberal (gamma .48; p  .001).22
The brains of conservatives react differently, on average, from
the brains of liberals to an unexpected (but completely non-
political) stimulus.23 And it is possible to make accurate pre-
dictions of the political beliefs of adults on the basis of the
observed (not self-reported) social behaviors of those same
individuals at nursery school twenty years previously.24 In
sum, people vary dramatically in their orientation toward
order, threat, risk, uncertainty, and obedience to tradi-
tional values and these variations in turn are statistically
related to political attitudes and ideology. Ideology is con-
nected to foundational preferences for social and political
structure and these preferences likely have a basis in neuro-
transmitters, brain activity, and ultimately genetics.
We have hopes that raising the possibility that politics
is partially heritable will encourage a much needed recon-
sideration of the nature of political temperament. The
discipline would benefit from trying new research meth-
ods and from viewing political ideologies as something
other than completely “context dependent.” In our view,
if genes shape politics, the connection does not run
through the musings of nineteenth- and twentieth-
century political theorists but rather through the core
principals of social life as they have existed since before
we were fully human.
Conclusion
No scientifically literate person in this day and age can
claim that genes are irrelevant to human behavior and
predispositions, yet many people are deeply discomfited
by this reality. One common solution is to concede that
genes affect behavior, but to assert that the connection is
extraordinarily complex and then to proceed as if this
complexity negated any requirement that we incorporate
this sometimes uncomfortable reality into research into,
and understanding of, human behavior. This is where we
part company. To us, the reality of a complex link between
genes and political phenotypes means political scientists
must rein in their reflexive environmentalism and join
forces with behavioral geneticists and others in the biolog-
ical community to continue the exacting, time-consuming,
but deeply exciting genetic research that has already begun
the process of teasing out this complexity.
We never claimed that a focus that incorporates genes
obviates the need to also consider the environment. Indeed,
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casting the issue as genes competing with the environ-
ment, as Charney does in his conclusion (“if genes count
for more than environment the phenomena of liberalism
and conservatism . . . become utterly incomprehensible”)
is silly and misses the point. What we claim is that genes
are important to political thought and behavior. We real-
ize that for a discipline as completely vested in nurture
alone as political science, the need to look at both nurture
and nature will constitute an important shift. As Charney
puts it:
The claim of Alford, Funk, and Hibbing is indeed astonishing,
because if true, it would require nothing less than a revision of
our understanding of all of human history, much, if not most of
political science, sociology, anthropology, and psychology, as well
as, perhaps, our understanding of what it means to be human.25
The “claim” is of course not wholly ours, but more
appropriately the claim of over twenty years of behavioral
geneticists who pioneered research in this area. But we are
in complete agreement with what is at stake. Our 2005
article found a substantial degree of heritability for polit-
ical orientations, but political behavior subtends far more
than political orientations and the study of genetic influ-
ences does not end with a single classical twin study. Genet-
icists can only go so far in their investigation of a field as
foreign to them as political behavior. Political scientists
need to engage if genetic research in this area is to progress
beyond rudimentary dependent variables and if political
science is going to progress beyond a narrowly limited set
of environmental independent variables. Colleagues from
across the social and natural sciences are currently con-
ducting research on large-scale human social cooperation
that is among the most exciting and challenging scientific
revolutions of our times. With political scientists largely
isolated from this effort, it is no surprise that researchers
from other fields have mostly missed the point that large-
scale human cooperation is politics, not just neuroeconom-
ics or evolutionary psychology. We can right this wrong if,
and only if, we join with our colleagues from across the
sciences in this grand search.
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